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6.1 Introduction
Malaise and stagnation notwithstanding, Japan is a rich country, and
the Japanese have substantial individual wealth. However, the data suggest
that somehow the accumulated net worth of the household sector (exclud-
ing land) is smaller than its savings should have achieved. In an earlier pa-
per,  Ando (2002) examined this capital loss and attributed some three-
fourths of it to losses in the household-sector holdings of corporate equity.
In this paper we examine in much further detail the components of this loss
and the features of the operations of Japanese corporations1 that possibly
led to it.
The Japanese National Accounts are the starting point for a quantitative
analysis, but the nature of some key measures complicates this. Other mea-
sures simply are not provided. Still, we believe that the available data and
compelling circumstantial evidence support our propositions.
The most important problem we encountered during our investigation
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1. Please note that our discussion of corporations is in the framework of the National Ac-
counts, so we are looking at a much larger universe than just those ﬁrms that have equity pub-
licly traded on stock exchanges.was the extremely high depreciation recorded in the Japanese National Ac-
counts. Thus, we have constructed a series of capital stock and deprecia-
tion that conforms more closely to international practice.
After our data adjustments, we ﬁnd that the rate of return on assets in
the corporate sector (whether or not land is included) is very low. Another
way of expressing this is that there has been excessively large investment by
the corporate sector in physical assets that seem to have low productivity
or earning capacity. This idea of “excessive” investment is also borne out
by the fact that the market value of the equity of the corporate sector is
lower than the liquidation (or replacement) value (i.e., the market sees that
the investment is of low quality). Another way to see the same point is to
look at average Tobin’s q (which is below 1).
This low market valuation (and low quality investment) seems to arise
because of the corporate governance structure that permits low dividend
payments. Since the level of dividends is so small and the historical pattern
of dividends does not give any basis to expect them to increase, even when
operating surplus and corporate proﬁts after tax increase over time, there
is no reason for the market to increase its valuation of corporate equities.
Thus, households ﬁnd themselves with very little value in their ownership
of corporations: They are not rewarded for their savings, and this results in
the small value of their net worth excluding the value of their land. Faced
with this situation, households continue to save a large fraction of their in-
come in an attempt to increase their net worth to a satisfactory level.
In addition, these low dividend payments leave cash in the hands of
ﬁrms, which are then able to continue to make more low-productivity in-
vestments. In other market systems we would expect this to have been cor-
rected by takeovers, which are very rare in Japan, as is well known.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 6.2.1 discusses the accumula-
tion of net worth of the household sector, while section 6.2.2 examines land
as a determinant of consumption behavior. Section 6.3.1 discusses corpo-
rate saving and dividend payments, and the balance sheet and the capital
loss of the corporate sector are discussed in Section 3.2, Corporate invest-
ment behavior and ﬁnancing decisions are addressed in section 6.3.3. Sec-
tion 6.4 concludes.
6.2 Accumulation of Net Worth by the Household Sector
6.2.1 Household Net Worth and Saving
This section will present the capital loss incurred by the households in
more detail than shown in Ando (2002).2 Table 6.1 summarizes the accu-
156 Albert Ando, Dimitrios Christelis, and Tsutomu Miyagawa
2. Our results here are slightly diﬀerent than the ones reported in that paper due to small





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)mulation of net worth by the Japanese household sector from 1971 to 1998.
Details on the data are in box 6.1 and the table 6.1 notes.
The E sections bring together information for the ﬂows and changes in
stocks. For 1971–1998, the sector’s net worth increased some ¥1,535 trillion
in 1990 prices (row E.1), whereas savings adjusted for net capital transfers
and statistical discrepancy was about ¥940 trillion (row E.2   F.1   F.2  
F.3). Thus, the household sector had a net capital gain of ¥595 trillion (row
E.1 minus E.2, which also is E.3   E.4).
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Box 6.1 Savings and Net Worth Data in Tables 6.1 and 6.7
In each table, A through D relate changes in the value of stocks
to ﬂows for four broad components of net worth. Changes in net
worth components are not computed directly. Instead, they are
related to the ﬂow-of-funds data through a reconciliation calcu-
lation. One element of the reconciliation is changes resulting
from general inﬂation. For three categories—reproducible tangi-
ble assets (A), nonreproducible tangible assets (B), and equities
(D)—this inﬂation loss is not shown separately because one sec-
tor’s loss is not another sector’s gain. Thus, the reconciliation is
the result of the diﬀerence between the price index for the asset
and the deﬂator for total consumption expenditures.
For ﬁnancial assets (C), losses to creditors are gains to debtors,
so the eﬀects of general inﬂation are reported explicitly (line C.4)
rather than as part of the reconciliation entry (line C.3).
Speciﬁcally, we multiplied the initial stock by the rate of change
of the consumption expenditure deﬂator and recorded the result-
ing amount as inﬂation gain (loss). What is left is recorded as rec-
onciliation.
Flow is positive when assets increase more than liabilities, and
is negative when liabilities increase more than assets. For nonre-
producible tangible assets (B), the ﬂow is primarily net purchase
(sale) of land by that sector. These assets are mostly land, but also
include timber, ﬁsheries, and subsoil assets. The National
Accounts Division assures us that these are at market value. We
do not know exactly how the information is obtained, but we
have no choice but to accept it.
The structure of the National Accounts requires that the sum
of the net acquisition of all items on the balance sheet equals sav-
ings recorded in the ﬂow portion of the accounts plus net capital
transfers received plus statistical discrepancy.The overall gain is due entirely to land. Excluding land, overall capital
losses were some ¥236 trillion (row E.1a minus E.2a, which also is E.3a  
E.4a). Most of this is the inﬂation loss suﬀered on net ﬁnancial assets (row
E.4a). (Savings excluding land is F.1 minus B.2.)
Throughout most of 1971–1998, the net ﬁnancial liability of the govern-
ment sector was very small. Most of the net ﬁnancial asset position of the
household sector was matched by the net ﬁnancial liability position of non-
ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial corporations. The inﬂation loss of the household
sector, therefore, was largely matched by the inﬂation gain of the corporate
sector.
Why did this inﬂation gain of corporations not appear as an increase in
the value of corporate equity owned by the household sector? During most
of this period, corporations retained substantial earnings, yet the house-
hold sector gained less than ¥40 trillion in the value of corporate equity, far
smaller than the accumulated retained earnings and capital gains of cor-
porations combined. We believe this is one of the most unusual features of
the Japanese economy. It may provide a clue to one of the causes for the low
level of consumption by the household sector. We will therefore look care-
fully at the corporate sector and how its savings and accumulation of assets
are related to the value of corporate equity outstanding.
6.2.2 Land
The household balance sheet is shown in table 6.2, column (5) for 1998
(tables for years 1970, 1980, and 1990 are available online at http://www.
nber.org/data-appendix/ando_et_al). It is immediately apparent how large
a share the value of land is in household net worth. The way the extraordi-
narily high price of land aﬀects the savings behavior of the household sec-
tor and why one might want to exclude it from the net worth of that sector
is the topic of this section. We believe that it is more insightful to exclude
the land component of net worth. This is based in part on the fact that the
household sector has been a small net seller of land throughout the period
studied, 1971–1998, and that the proceeds were used to acquire other as-
sets.
Another reason is the way Japanese households view land. For a typical
family, the land on which its residence stands is both a major asset and, by
deﬁnition, makes the imputed consumption of housing services very high.
Thus, it is probable that a family views a rise in the price of land as repre-
senting both an increase in its assets and a rise in the cost of living, with
each oﬀsetting the other. If families can routinely borrow using land as col-
lateral, a higher price of land may facilitate additional consumption. How-
ever, consumer borrowing, including mortgages, appears to be very low in
Japan, suggesting either that the market is not well developed or that con-
sumers do not wish to borrow. We therefore believe that most families view
net worth excluding land as what is available to them over time.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.That said, there are families who own more land than they need for their
residences or farms. For them, excess land is like any other asset that can
be sold to ﬁnance consumption as the need arises. Thus, the value of land
is part of their life-cycle net worth, and an increase in the price of land must
be viewed as an addition to their resources. At the other extreme, for fam-
ilies who do not own any land and aspire to acquire it, an increase in the
price of land is a signiﬁcant increase in the cost of living without a com-
pensating increase in their income. Although there are signiﬁcant alloca-
tive consequences within the household sector, for the sector as a whole,
the responses of these two extreme groups to a change in price of land
should largely oﬀset each other.
We will now look at the literature on the eﬀect of land on consumption.
There are two studies we are aware of that oﬀer evidence on the eﬀect of an
increase in the price of land on consumption. Ogawa et al. (1996) introduce
into a consumption function three components of wealth held by house-
holds: liquid ﬁnancial assets, net illiquid ﬁnancial assets, and tangible
wealth (an estimate of the value of land and residential structures). They
ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of tangible wealth is very close to zero and its stan-
dard error is larger than the estimated value of the coeﬃcient. They con-
clude that consumption is not aﬀected by tangible wealth held by house-
holds. Because they deﬁne tangible wealth as the sum of the value of land
and an imputedvalue of residential structures, their result does not bear di-
rectly on the eﬀect of the price of land on consumption. However, because
more than two-thirds of the ﬂuctuation of the variable is due to changes in
the value of land, which is itself due almost entirely to price variations, we
may view his result as generally indicating that consumption does not re-
spond to land price variation.
More direct evidence is provided by Murata (1999). She estimates a time
series consumption function in the error correction formulation. The log
of the consumption-income ratio is a function of the ratio of wealth to in-
come and the ratio of land price to consumption prices, among other
things. She obtains a small but signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient for the ratio
of land price to consumption prices. This again suggests that an increase in
the relative price of land is unlikely to increase the consumption-income
ratio.
There are two other studies we have looked at that are not helpful for our
purposes. Dekle (1994) is hard to interpret because he regresses the level of
consumption on the price of land and the rate of growth of output by pre-
fecture without controlling for the level of income or wealth. Thus, the
price of land can easily be a proxy for a basic resource variable in his esti-
mation.
Takayama (1992) runs a regression of consumption on diﬀerent mea-
sures of wealth and ﬁnds that the coeﬃcient of net real assets (which con-
sist essentially of real estate holdings) has a small positive value but is also
Ineﬃciency of Corporate Investment and Distortion of Savings Behavior 163highly signiﬁcant. However, this variable is nonzero only for homeowners.
Thus, because he does not control for home ownership in his regression, its
coeﬃcient can represent the eﬀect of home ownership rather than the eﬀect
of the value of real wealth.
Regarded alone, none of the considerations reviewed above deﬁnitely
justify focusing attention on net worth excluding land as a critical factor in
determining the saving-income ratio, but together with the reasons given in
the text, they provide reasonable support to doing so.
6.3 Savings and Net Worth Accumulation by the Corporate Sector
6.3.1 Income Flows
This section examines the savings and dividend payments of Japanese
ﬁrms. It shows that they are not only exceptionally small, but that they
have also decreased over time, thus providing an explanation of the low
valuation of the ﬁrms. We must begin however by examining a variety of
data problems that are present in the Japanese National Accounts and that
can seriously bias any analysis of the corporate sector behavior.
First, both the “nonﬁnancial corporate enterprises” and “ﬁnancial in-
stitutions” components include not just private businesses, but also public
enterprises. It is impossible to separate them completely for years before
1990. This is also true of the total business sector, which includes unincor-
porated enterprises. With the new National Accounts based on the System
of National Accounts (SNA93; United Nations et al. 1993), this is not an
ongoing problem, but it will remain for prior periods. Thus, it is impossible
to study long-term patterns in the behavior of the private business sector.
Second, even using SNA93, the National Accounts report neither the
compensation of employees nor the value added of output by sector. Thus,
it is very diﬃcult to assess how productively labor and capital inputs are
utilized. Because the way total value added is distributed to the factors
contributing to production is important to our analysis, we use the whole
economy excluding agriculture, housing, and government.
The method of computing depreciation in the National Accounts is a
third source of diﬃculties. Depreciation is the change in value of a pro-
ductive asset “as a result of physical deterioration, normal obsolescence,
or normal accidental damage” (SNA 1993, 147, chap. 6.179). This can be
calculated in several ways. For example, U.S. ﬁrms typically use diﬀerent
methods to compute depreciation for tax purposes and for ﬁnancial re-
porting purposes. In the U.S. national accounts, depreciation, or the capi-
tal consumption allowance, uses uniform service lives and empirically
based depreciation patterns (compared to a wide range of methodologies
allowed by GAAP [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles] and the tax
code), as well as current cost rather than historic cost, which is used for ﬁ-
164 Albert Ando, Dimitrios Christelis, and Tsutomu Miyagawanancial and tax reporting. The diﬀerence between this number and depre-
ciation reported for tax purposes is called the capital consumption adjust-
ment (hereafter CCAdj).3
Unfortunately, Japanese national income data historically do not in-
clude such a CCAdj. Rather, under the 1968 System of National Accounts
(SNA68; United Nations 1968), depreciation using the tax code’s provi-
sions for service lives and historic cost was reported. Under SNA93, be-
ginning with 1990 data, an adjustment that reﬂects the diﬀerence between
historic and current cost is computed, but tax-code lives are still used. De-
preciation using the tax code is (intentionally) faster than actual values.
Using historical cost leads to under-statement in periods of high inﬂation.
Adjustments to a current-cost basis were included with other items in the
revaluation account under SNA68, but cannot be separated out to adjust
the reported depreciation series (see Economic Planning Agency [EPA]
1978). Thus, we have to adjust the reported depreciation with our own es-
timate of the CCAdj using a method similar to Hayashi (1986).
We can see the eﬀect of depreciation in table 6.3, which shows the way
value added is distributed to the factors contributing to production. Table
6.3 presents data for the United States and for Japan using both National
Accounts and our capital stock and depreciation estimates. The estimates
that are used make a substantial diﬀerence in the evaluation of the sector’s
performance.
As we have just observed, the Japanese National Accounts do not pro-
vide information on either a measure of output or the compensation of em-
ployees for the corporate sector. We will therefore work with the whole
economy less agriculture, housing, and government.4
First, let us compare the United States (part A) to Japan using National
Accounts estimates (part B). The ﬁgures for 1970 are radically dissimilar,
presumably because the Japanese economy was still in the process of a
rapid transformation. It may also be because the data for this period are of
lower quality, as the National Accounts only begin with 1970.
Over the entire period, there are a number of diﬀerences. The ratio of
employee compensation to gross domestic product (GDP; column [7]) de-
clined steadily in the United States, whereas it was increasing steadily in
Japan. The ratio of operating surplus to GDP (column [8]) was declining
sharply and steadily in Japan, whereas there is no particular pattern for the
United States.
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3. See http://www.bea.gov, click on Methodologies, and under “National Programs” see “A
Guide to the NIPAs,” M10–12.
4. Information on estimates of output and its composition for the housing sector were
kindly supplied to us by the National Account Division, Economic and Social Research In-
stitute, Cabinet Oﬃce. The GDP for Japan reported here reﬂects our estimates of the distri-
bution of the imputed banking services among sectors. The U.S. ﬁgures incorporate the dis-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Although the share of depreciation (column [6]) was increasing during
the 1970s and 1980s for both, it is much larger for Japan and continued to
increase in the 1990s, whereas for the United States it stabilized. As for the
capital-output ratio (column [9]), there was a steady increase for Japan,
and no particular pattern for the United States. The ratio of depreciation
to capital stock (column [10]) was increasing in the United States but
falling in Japan.
It is hard to see how the diﬀerence in the depreciation rate (12 percent in
Japan versus 8 percent in the United States, as shown in column [10]) can
persist when the technologies available in both countries are approxi-
mately the same. It is possible that when the Japanese economy was still go-
ing through its rapid transformation—that is, until the early 1970s—de-
preciation did indeed proceed more rapidly in Japan than in the United
States. It is furthermore conceivable that this higher depreciation rate be-
came incorporated into Japan’s accounting practices and tax code and thus
has persisted even after the economy matured and “true” depreciation be-
came roughly comparable to that for the United States. In such a case, ra-
tional managers presumably would not abandon capital stock before it was
economical to do so. That would create a situation in which data for capi-
tal stock and depreciation are seriously biased relative to their true quan-
tities.
To remedy this situation, we constructed a series for net capital stock
and depreciation that uses current costs and empirically based deprecia-
tion patterns. Our series is based on depreciation rates suggested by Hul-
ten and Wykoﬀ (1981), as adapted to the Japanese case by Hayashi and In-
oue (1991). We leave the National Accounts estimates for residential
houses untouched. The details of our reconstruction are reported in ap-
pendix A (available online at http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/ando_
et_al), and results are recorded in part C of table 6.3.
Our estimate of the net stock of capital stock in 1998 is 18 percent larger
than the National Accounts estimate. Our depreciation estimate is 16 per-
cent smaller than the National Accounts estimate, adjusted by us to reﬂect
current costs. As a result, our overall depreciation rate for Japan during the
1990s is around 8 percent, which is about two-thirds of the (approximately)
12 percent implied by the adjusted national accounts data. A simple theo-
retical example of the consequences of assuming a depreciation rate much
higher than the one that actually prevailed in the economy is in appendix
B (available online at http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/ando_et_al).
If this accounting bias took place in the United States, where the ﬁnan-
cial markets are well developed and investors are constantly seeking arbi-
trage opportunities, sooner or later the market value of equities would ad-
just to correct it. If the market value persisted in reﬂecting the biased
accounting records, in the United States, an attempt at a takeover of a ﬁrm
would be likely to occur. In Japan, however, since corporations are seldom
Ineﬃciency of Corporate Investment and Distortion of Savings Behavior 167subjected to a takeover or merger challenge, such biased data may well be
accepted in the equity market and persist for a long time. We believe that
these accounting biases are some of the factors contributing to the creation
of a large market valuation discrepancy in the Japanese corporate equity
market that is to be discussed later.
Having adjusted depreciation, let us now proceed to a review of the div-
idends and retained earnings of Japanese nonﬁnancial corporations and ﬁ-
nancial institutions. Be reminded that these sectors include both private
corporations and public enterprises and that we are looking at this mix-
ture. Our impression is that the size of public enterprises is especially large
in the case of the ﬁnancial institutions sector.
In table 6.4, parts A and B, we present data for 1990 to 1998 using the re-
vised National Accounts on the basis of the SNA93. We cannot use data
based on the SNA68 since the deﬁnition of dividends paid by ﬁnancial in-
stitutions contained a number of items, including a part of imputed prop-
erty income due to holders of life insurance policies, that swamped divi-
dends paid to equity holders (see EPA 2000b). The data based on the
SNA93 give ﬁgures for dividends paid to equity holders separated from
other payments, and the diﬀerence is very large. For 1998, gross dividends
paid by ﬁnancial institutions in the old accounts were ¥4.4 trillion, whereas
they are only ¥0.7 trillion in the new accounts. For this reason, in this sub-
section in which the income of equity holders is one of the central issues,
we have no choice but to conﬁne our discussion to the period 1990–1998
because the data on an SNA93 basis are available beginning only in 1990.
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Table 6.4 Corporate Sector, Savings, and Net Dividends Paid, SNA93 Data (¥ trillions)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
A. Nonﬁnancial Corporations
1. Savings Aa 7.41 4.42 2.15 3.18 3.25 5.53 10.27 14.69 10.15
2. Savings Bb n.a. –4.40 –7.90 –7.95 –7.60 –9.11 2.19 5.39 0.72
3. Savings Cc 10.33 6.15 2.88 2.61 2.96 6.25 14.63 18.11 12.39
4. Net dividends 
paid 2.78 2.74 2.61 2.62 2.39 2.88 2.50 2.56 2.25
B. Financial Institutions
5. Savings Aa 6.17 6.89 6.05 5.67 4.69 6.58 8.63 9.64 10.32
6. Savings Bb n.a. 7.67 7.43 7.14 6.61 8.52 10.39 11.34 11.78
7. Savings Cc 6.96 7.29 6.90 6.51 5.96 8.06 9.84 10.80 11.16
8. Net dividends 
paid –0.33 –0.36 –0.34 –0.32 –0.26 –0.34 –0.41 –0.45 –0.41
Source: ESRI (2001, 94–97, 500–09).
Note: n.a.   not available
aUsing National Accounts depreciation (thus, at historical cost).
bUsing National Accounts depreciation and CCAdj.
cUsing our estimates of depreciation (based on Hulten-Wykoﬀ service lives and current cost).Later in the paper, where it is essential to cover a longer period, we attempt
to avoid dealing with dividends paid by ﬁnancial institutions.
In addition, there are dramatic diﬀerences in the size of retained earn-
ings of these two sectors between the old accounts and new accounts.
These diﬀerences appear to be mostly due to changes in current transfers.
We have not yet found speciﬁc references to this issue in the National Ac-
counts Division’s explanation of changes. We would, however, venture a
guess that the Division changed the procedure for handling the write-oﬀof
bad debts and that this is the main reason why there has been such a large
change in current transfers and, hence, retained earnings.
Under these circumstances, it is extremely diﬃcult to make coherent
sense of these partial income statements for corporations. The best we can
do is to oﬀer a few observations that may be useful for future investigation.
1. The net dividend payment by the nonﬁnancial corporate sector is
steady at about ¥2.5 trillion per year (table 6.4, line 4). The payment of net
dividends by ﬁnancial institutions (line 8) is negative and around ¥–0.3 tril-
lion. Thus, these two sectors together paid other sectors of the economy,
primarily the household sector and the rest of the world sector, a total of
2.2 trillion yen in dividends per year during the period 1990 to 1998. This
contrasts with dividend payments by American corporations (ﬁnancial
and nonﬁnancial combined) during the same period, starting at $144 bil-
lion in 1990 and steadily increasing to $309.2 billion in 1998.5 At an ex-
change rate of ¥120 to a dollar, American corporations paid roughly ten
times the amount of dividends that were paid by Japanese corporations.
2. If we accept the ﬁgures reported in the National Accounts for the
nonﬁnancial and ﬁnancial corporate sectors combined, corporate retained
earnings, after tax (savings) adjusted for CCAdj, were close to zero for the
period 1990 through 1995 as shown in table 6.4. For the years 1996, 1997,
and 1998, the corporate retained earnings were over ¥10 trillion. For the
entire period 1990–1998, their average was about ¥5 trillion per year. If we
replace the national accounts estimate of depreciation with our own esti-
mate, the retained earnings (savings with CCAdj) would be roughly ¥10
trillion greater per year, or around ¥15 trillion on average. This diﬀerence
reﬂects the diﬀerence between depreciation with CCAdj given by the na-
tional accounts and our own estimates, shown in table 6.3, column (2). We
can see the importance of making sure that the estimate of depreciation is
reasonable and realistic. The retained earnings after tax with CCAdj and
IVA (Inventory Valuation Adjustments) for U.S. corporations (nonﬁnan-
cial and ﬁnancial combined) ﬂuctuate over time, but on average they are
approximately $125 billion per year. The Japanese ﬁgure is roughly one-
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5. As shown in Table 1.16 of the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts; available
at http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableViewFixed.asp?selectedTable 26&FirstYear 
2001&last year 2002&Freq Qtr.third of the U.S. amount if we take the national accounts estimate of de-
preciation, whereas it is about equal to the U.S. amount if we take our own
estimate of depreciation.
3. Even though we believe that Japanese corporations have retained
more earnings and that their capital stock is probably larger than recorded,
we suspect that the retained earnings of Japanese corporations have not
contributed to the value of equities at all. One reason for our suspicion is
shown in table 6.5, where the historical record of the amount of dividends
paid by nonﬁnancial corporations is shown. We have to rely on the data on
the SNA68 basis here, since we wish to have a long time series. Therefore,
we cannot work with the dividend payments of ﬁnancial institutions. Since
we do not have information on the output of corporations, we report
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Table 6.5 Dividends of Nonﬁnancial Incorporated Enterprises, SNA68 Data
(¥ trillions)
Year Dividends Paid Dividends Received Net Dividends Paid Sector GDPa
1970 1.521 0.501 1.020 58.2
1971 1.622 0.529 1.092 63.7
1972 1.782 0.585 1.197 72.8
1973 2.233 0.770 1.463 89.2
1974 2.579 0.925 1.655 104.9
1975 2.424 0.858 1.566 113.3
1976 2.477 0.871 1.606 127.9
1977 2.334 0.871 1.464 141.5
1978 2.729 0.975 1.754 156.1
1979 2.914 1.027 1.887 170.2
1980 3.190 1.174 2.016 185.6
1981 3.502 1.289 2.213 199.8
1982 3.291 1.210 2.081 210.1
1983 3.378 1.216 2.161 218.4
1984 3.453 1.250 2.203 233.3
1985 3.698 1.604 2.095 249.2
1986 3.845 1.842 2.003 258.5
1987 4.177 2.991 1.186 270.6
1988 4.420 3.666 0.754 289.5
1989 6.465 5.412 1.054 311.6
1990 5.597 5.451 0.146 337.2
1991 5.744 5.647 0.097 361.7
1992 5.599 5.394 0.205 370.2
1993 5.668 5.117 0.550 369.1
1994 5.265 4.468 0.798 367.1
1995 5.709 4.325 1.384 370.7
1996 5.899 2.918 2.981 382.4
1997 5.855 3.240 2.615 386.7
1998 5.691 3.231 2.460 374.1
Sources: EPA (2000a, 72–73). See notes for table 6.3 for calculation of GDP.
aPrivate business GDP, excluding the agriculture, housing, and ﬁnancial sectors.private, nonfarm, nonﬁnancial business GDP as the scale indicator. The
most amazing fact is that nominal net dividend payments have hardly in-
creased since 1970. In addition, there is a strange rise of dividends received
from 1987 through 1995, making net dividends paid during this period ex-
tremely erratic and close to zero.
Retained earnings increase the value of equity, because they presumably
contribute to increased proﬁts and, hence, to future increases in dividends.
In the case of Japanese corporations, however, the retention of substantial
amounts of earnings by corporations, have not contributed to an increase
in dividends at all. Thus, from the point of view of equity holders, retained
earnings are of little value. Given the historical pattern of dividend pay-
ments, the market value of equity even at the end of the 1990s may be con-
sidered remarkably high. The average dividend-price ratio for those cor-
porations listed at the Tokyo Stock Exchange, ﬁrst division, and paying
dividends for 1998, 1999, and 2000 is reported to be 1.3 percent, 0.9 per-
cent, and 1.1 percent respectively (Bank of Japan 2002).
We have noted that there are substantial diﬀerences in the pattern of div-
idend payments and retained earnings of nonﬁnancial corporations be-
tween national accounts data on the SNA68 basis and data on the SNA93
basis. In table 6.6, we report dividends paid and received according to the
data on the SNA93 basis. The pattern is indeed diﬀerent, especially in the
period 1987–1995 when the data on the SNA68 basis showed strange in-
creases in dividends received. The pattern shown by the data on the SNA93
basis is perfectly smooth throughout the 1990s. The basic feature of the
time pattern of dividend payments is common in both versions of data:
Dividend payments show no sign of growth to reﬂect the increasing scale
of the economy over time.
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Table 6.6 Dividends Paid and Received by Corporations, SNA 93 Data (¥ trillions)
Nonﬁnancial Financial
Year Paid Received Paid Received Totala
1990 4.971 2.193 0.918 1.251 2.445
1991 5.090 2.347 0.837 1.195 2.385
1992 4.918 2.311 0.794 1.139 2.262
1993 4.960 2.336 0.857 1.172 2.309
1994 4.536 2.149 0.768 1.031 2.123
1995 4.942 2.057 0.717 1.061 2.540
1996 5.040 2.539 0.700 1.115 2.087
1997 5.100 2.544 0.718 1.167 2.108
1998 4.958 2.706 0.666 1.081 1.837
Source: ESRI (2001, 94–97).
Note: Includes nonﬁnancial and ﬁnancial corporations. Excludes withdrawals of income
from quasi corporations.
aNet payments.We now turn our attention to the balance sheet of corporations and the
relationship between the pattern of income and the structure of the balance
sheet.
6.3.2 Capital Accumulation by Corporations 
and the Valuation of Corporate Equity
The consolidated balance sheet of the corporate sector is shown in table
6.2, column (3). For those of us who normally operate outside Japan, there
are some striking features. First, the value of land (see line [b]) is enormous,
a substantial part of tangible assets. At the height of the asset bubble in
1987–1991, its value even exceeded that of reproducibles. If it is added to
the denominator of the ratio of operating surplus to ﬁxed capital, the rate
of return becomes minuscule. From the point of view of valuing a ﬁrm,
there is no justiﬁcation for omitting the value of land. In practice, however,
a ﬁrm that has held land for a long time may not be using its true economic
cost. Indeed, regardless of when the land was acquired and what was paid
for it, there is no reason to account for its cost properly if management
does not feel the need to compensate the ﬁrm’s equity holders properly.
Second, the net equity outstanding is a small fraction of the accounting
net worth of corporations (deﬁned in table 6.2, line [g]). When ﬁnancial
markets are functioning eﬃciently and expectations on the contribution of
reproducible physical assets to earnings are realized, accounting net worth
and the market value of net equity should be close, if not necessarily equal,
to each other. However, in Japan they are not. Rather, there is a gap, which
we term the market valuation discrepancy. This is calculated in table 6.2,
line (k). When the market valuation discrepancy is zero, the reproduction
cost of reproducible ﬁxed assets and the market value of land are fully re-
ﬂected in the “value of the ﬁrm” (deﬁned as the value of net equity out-
standing plus net ﬁnancial liabilities). Another way of saying this is that
Tobin’s average q is 1. When the value of land is very large, however, the in-
terpretation of this concept becomes somewhat ambiguous, but we believe
that the only tenable generalization of the concept is the inclusion of the
value of land in the denominator. The value of q so computed is reported
in table 6.2, line (m). For the consolidated corporate sector, it ranges from
a low of 0.32 in 1980 to a high of 0.52 in 1998.
When the average q is properly calculated, it is well known that its value
can be reduced from unity, even in equilibrium, when the pattern of the de-
preciation allowance under the corporate proﬁt tax system is accelerated
relative to the pattern of economic depreciation (see, e.g., Gordon and
Malkiel 1981). However, it can be shown that the quantitative eﬀect of this
mechanism is quite minor, less than 5 percent of the reproduction cost of
capital. Therefore, this consideration alone cannot account for the devia-
tion of q from unity reported in table 6.2.
The possible reasons why the estimated value of q deviates so substan-
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value of market valuation discrepancy.6 When the market valuation dis-
crepancy is negative and large, we are inclined to think of four possible rea-
sons: (a) For whatever reason, the price paid for the reproducible ﬁxed as-
sets is no longer justiﬁed in terms of the anticipated income stream it will
generate; (b) There is a dramatic change in the value of land; (c) There may
be serious imperfections in the capital market; (d) There is a deliberate pol-
icy by management to maintain the pattern of a very small and stagnant pay-
ment pattern of dividends. We consider the fourth reason as the most likely.
Let us recall the observation with which we ended the preceding section,
namely, that dividend payments by these corporations are not only very
small, but also that they have not increased much at all. Here we face a se-
rious data problem, because dividend payment information in the national
accounts based on the SNA68 is not reliable, while the data based on the
SNA93 is available only starting in 1990. We have no choice but to gain
some sense of the pattern from these inconsistent data. Let us ﬁrst look at
the longer time series using the data based on the SNA68. Since net divi-
dend payments by ﬁnancial institutions are negligible, we can match net
dividend payments of nonﬁnancial corporations reported in table 6.5 and
the market value of their net equity outstanding in table 6.2. This dividend-
price ratio averages approximately 2.6 percent for the period 1970–1998,
declining during the period. Thus, in the 1970s it was 4.8 percent, in the
1980s it was 1.8 percent, and in the 1990s it was only 0.7 percent. This ra-
tio is remarkably low, given that dividend payments did not grow at all,
whereas the scale variable increased by seven times during the same period.
For the 1990s, we can partially check this ﬁnding using the data based on
the SNA93. Dividend payments on this basis are given in table 6.4, lines (4)
and (8). The dividend-price ratio for 1999 is 1.9 percent (1.4 percent for
1991), conﬁrming the pattern given by the data based on the SNA68.
Therefore, we conclude that at least a partial reason why the market value
of equity is so low is that dividend payments have been extremely small and
did not grow over time. This is a puzzling pattern. If the accounting net
worth is correctly estimated in the National Income Accounts (NIA) and
the market value of equity is so depressed, in a well-functioning market, we
would expect that someone would purchase the ﬁrm and liquidate its as-
sets, realizing a major capital gain.
Table 6.7 traces development of the balance sheet for corporate capital
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6. Others have estimated the Tobin’s average q, and Hoshi and Kashyap (1990) summarize
them conveniently. Basically, estimates of q using data from individual companies listed on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange are close to unity, while those estimated using aggregate data are
signiﬁcantly less than unity. Both aggregate data and microdata require many adjustments
and imputations for the purpose of estimating q, and a satisfactory resolution of this paradox
will require a large-scale data analysis. It may be noted that the estimate of q using all ﬁrms























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.stock in the same way table 6.1 does for the household sector (details on the
data are also in box 6.1).
By deﬁnition, the sum ﬂow of funds by use in table 6.7 (line D2) equals
the total by source (line E). Unfortunately, the statistical discrepancy entry
(E.3) is fairly large, but the most surprising item is net capital transfers re-
ceived (E.2). For 1991–1998, these include the government bailout of ﬁrms
in this sector, and it is nearly ﬁve times as large as accumulated retained
earnings. It is also a sizable amount in the two earlier periods; we are not
quite sure why.
Accounting equity (D.1) is divided between the market value of equity
(D.5) and the market valuation discrepancy (D.6). In the Japanese Na-
tional Accounts (and in SNA93) the discrepancy is designated as net
worth. We believe that this designation is not only misleading but also gives
users a wrong impression of the performance by corporations.
We ﬁnd it surprising that the market value of these corporations in-
creased by only ¥70 trillion between 1971 and 1998, whereas their ac-
counting equity increased by ¥472 trillion, thereby increasing the market
valuation discrepancy by ¥402 trillion. (Box 6.2 analyzes this gap.)
How does one explain the market valuation discrepancy? Part of the an-
swer is that, in the corporate governance structure in Japan, management
does not seem to feel any need to compensate equity owners. Thus, only to-
ken dividends are paid and scant attention is given to the market value of
equity.
Management may have convinced itself that the token dividend pay-
ments deﬁne very low costs of internally generated funds, and thus invest-
ment in capital projects can be justiﬁed even when the expected rate of re-
turn is quite low. This is especially true if managers are encouraged to make
their ﬁrms as large as possible, which is often said to be a goal of Japanese
ﬁrms.
Beyond that, we believe that decision rules based on management’s per-
ception of the cost of internally generated funds contribute to other un-
usual features of the Japanese economy. These include a very high capital-
labor ratio, a very low rate of return on capital for the corporate sector as
a whole, and a dramatically small ratio of the market value of equity to the
accounting value of ﬁrms. The puzzle is why new ﬁrms do not enter Japan-
ese markets, follow the policy of eﬃcient use of resources, and force older
ﬁrms to reform. In any case, the apparent existing decision rules are an im-
pediment to growth of the economy and the eﬃcient allocation of re-
sources.
This behavior may have historical roots. During the period immediately
after World War II, most capital facilities were destroyed, obsolete, or
both, so businesses needed to accumulate capital as quickly as possible to
build plants and acquire new technologies. Thus, retaining as much of their
revenue as possible for investment was a sensible policy, consistent with the
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building as large a depreciation reserve as possible dates from this period.
If corporations do not have to pay dividends to shareholders, the cost of in-
ternally generated funds is essentially zero.
Such behavior can be maintained only if the demand for output is grow-
ing rapidly and if additional labor to match the rapid increases in capital is
available. This was the case in the high-growth era, as Japan could shift a
well-educated labor force from the agricultural sector to manufacturing
and high-technology industries on a large scale and its labor cost was lower
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Box 6.2 Decomposing the Market Valuation 
Discrepancy Increase
Our starting point is the total of funds transferred from other
sectors of the economy to the corporate sector during 1971–1998.
This can be approximated using the data in table 6.7, column (4).
  280.6 Accounting equity ﬂow (D.2)
  –16.0 Statistical discrepancy (E.3)
  182.6 Inﬂation gain (C.4) (This is largely the
counterpart of the ¥217 trillion inﬂation loss
recorded in the household sector account, table
6.1, C.4.)
  479.2 Total funds transferred to corporate sector.
If the sector is operating eﬃciently at all and the ﬁnancial market
is functioning reasonably well, then the market value of the shares
of corporations in the sector should have increased at least by this
amount. It did not. The actual market value increased by only
¥69.7 trillion, creating a ¥409.5 trillion equity loss to owners.
The loss increases the market valuation discrepancy to the
extent individual items on the balance sheet of corporations did
not incur real capital gains and losses (data are from table 6.7).
  409.5 Equity owners’ loss
  8.4 Total capital gain of corporations, composed of:
–249.7 Loss on reproducible tangible assets
(A.3)
202.4 Gain on land (B.3)
55.7 Gain on net ﬁnancial assets (C.3)
  –16.0 Statistical discrepancy (E.3)
  402.0 Increase in market valuation discrepancy (D.6)compared to the United States and Germany. It was therefore able to price
its products suﬃciently low to expand its share of the market.
As demand and labor-supply growth slacken, the gross rate of return on
capital gradually declines, and presumably it becomes near the level of de-
preciation. At that point, ﬁrms must begin to reduce the level of investment
and distribute excess funds to holders of equity.
Such a point was reached quite some time ago in Japan, but ﬁrms con-
tinued to operate as they had previously. In part this is because equity own-
ers are in an exceptionally weak position to inﬂuence the policies of
management. There are two related reasons for this. First, Japanese law
encourages corporations to enforce strict majority rule in the election of
board members, rather than permitting cumulative voting. This means mi-
nority shareholders have very little leverage with management. Second, the
tradition of cross-shareholding arrangements among corporations makes
it extremely diﬃcult for outsiders to form a majority. Managers who detect
the prospect of a hostile majority group forming can quickly arrange for
friendly corporations to increase their ownership.7
6.3.3 Investment and Financing Decisions 
and the Rate of Return for Firms
We have singled out the dividend payment pattern as a noticeably un-
usual behavior of Japanese ﬁrms. We can also observe from table 6.3 that
the operating surplus of the business sector in Japan appears to be a con-
siderably smaller fraction of the value added less indirect taxes of the sec-
tor compared with the United States (15 percent versus 26 percent in
1998). Let us now consider if there is some connection between these two
observations. In table 6.8, columns (1) and (2), we present the ratio of op-
erating surplus to the value of reproducible and nonreproducible capital.
The former is computed using our own estimate of depreciation, described
in appendix A and adjusted for imputed banking services, while in the lat-
ter the value of reproducible capital is our own estimate. We are not sure
that our estimates for the years 1971 through 1973 are reliable. There may
be something unsatisfactory about the estimates of the capital stock re-
ported in the National Wealth Survey(EPA 1970). Even starting from 1974,
the rate of return on capital is quite low, and it declines steadily until it
reaches a level of around 4 percent for nonﬁnancial corporations and 5
percent for the total business sector in the 1990s. Given that this rate is be-
fore the corporate proﬁt tax, the rate of return is amazingly low.
This rate must be viewed as the measure of the marginal product of cap-
ital given the way it is computed. We are also interested in the rate of return
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7. In chapter nine of this volume, Yafeh notes that minority shareholders have fairly good
legal protection in Japan. This is true, and applies to diﬀerent issues. His concern is with the
way insider usually majority, shareholders treat other shareholders. Our concern is with the
way management insiders treat all shareholders.accruing to the investor in the ﬁrm. We consider the investor who owns the
equity and debt of the ﬁrm in the same proportion as the outstanding
quantities. In table 6.8, columns (3) through (5), we present the rate of re-
turn for such an investor. Column (3) is the ratio of dividends plus net in-
terest payments to the sum of the value of equity and net ﬁnancial liabili-
ties. Column (4) records real capital gains and losses for the same base, and
column (5) presents the total. This computation can be done only for the
total corporate sector. The total rate of return is the amazingly low value
of 2.91 percent. The rate reported in table 6.8, column (5) is for all corpo-
rations and is not strictly comparable with the one for nonﬁnancial corpo-
rations shown in column (1). Nevertheless, we should expect the one in col-
umn (5) to be smaller than the one on column (1), because the latter is the
rate before corporate proﬁt taxes, while the former is after corporate proﬁt
taxes.
In table 6.3, we have noted that the capital-output ratio for the total busi-
ness sector of Japan is much larger than the corresponding ratio for the
United States, certainly in the 1990s. For 1998, the Japanese ratio is 2.06,
whereas it is 1.48 for the United States. We are not including land in these
calculations, so that the price of land is not involved. This is consistent with
the fact that the rate of return for Japan is very low, much lower than the
typical rate obtained by using the U.S. data (see Ando, Hancock, and Saw-
chuck 1997).
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Table 6.8 Rate of Return on Corporations (Annual Percentage Rates)
Return on Capitalb Market Rate of Return
Nonﬁnancial Business Ordinary Capital Total
Period Corporations Sectorc Incomed Gainse Returnf
Averagea (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1971–1980 7.36 11.69 8.05 –6.50 1.58
1981–1990 5.55 7.30 4.94 3.54 8.56
1991–1998 3.67 5.04 1.82 –2.87 –1.06
1971–1998 5.18 7.54 4.71 –1.88 2.91
Source: EPA (2000), 79–89, 248–249, 322–337, 390–391 and appendix 1.
aGeometric average.
bOperating surplus adjusted for rent, depreciation, and imputed banking services divided by
the sum of the reproducible assets and land.
cIncludes households, unincorporated enterprises, and corporations.
dNet interest and net dividends paid divided by the sum of net equity outstanding and net ﬁ-
nancial liabilities. That is, payments to owners and creditors as a percentage of the capital
they provide to the ﬁrm.
eNominal capital gains minus inﬂation loss divided by the sum of net equity outstanding and
net ﬁnancial liabilities.
fGeometric average. Due to the particular averaging procedure adopted, the sum of columns
(3) and (4) is slightly diﬀerent from column (5)When a business ﬁrm’s perception of the cost of one factor is unrelated
to the price charged in the market for that factor, as it appears to be the
case for equity capital for Japanese ﬁrms, we should expect that many de-
cisions of the ﬁrm deviate substantially from those expected in the stan-
dard optimizing ﬁrms. Let us speculate on the investment and ﬁnancing
decisions perceived by Japanese corporate managers in the simplest pos-
sible case in which the ﬁrm cannot borrow, it does not need land, and there
is no corporate proﬁt tax. Managers wish to ﬁnance their entire invest-
ment from internal funds every period and view their objective as increas-
ing the size of their ﬁrms by a speciﬁc rate, g, indeﬁnitely. This may not be
a rational target, but any other arbitrary targets produce similar results.
The managers also know that they have complete control of the internal
funds (i.e., no dividends must be paid). They then must satisfy the ac-
counting identity:
(1)  K    K,
where   is the net rate of return on capital and thus  K is the net income
from the production process accruing to capital. Dividing both sides of
equation (1) by K, we have




     .
In equation (1a), we are assuming that the production function is homoge-
neous of ﬁrst degree and that the productivity increase is labor augment-
ing. The rate of growth of output is then equal to the rate of growth of cap-
ital on the steady state growth path, and they are both equal to g. Let us
suppose that the managers also believe that they must satisfy the eﬃciency









where d is the depreciation rate, and w is the wage rate, and E is the num-
ber of hours worked. The managers view the net return on capital,  K, as
available for their ﬁrms without cost, since their ﬁrms do not have to com-
pensate equity owners. To satisfy equation (1a), then, they choose K/E so
that the value of   on the left-hand side of equation (2) becomes g:
The important point illustrated by this simple example is that the re-
quired rate of return on K is not at all related to anything in the market. If
g is very small, the required net return on capital would also be quite
small, and the capital-labor ratio would be correspondingly very large.
The manager attempts to achieve an eﬃcient combination of labor and
capital from his point of view, but since the cost of capital is not related to
the price of funds demanded in the market, his decision cannot be gen-
uinely optimal.
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allowed to borrow, but still has to satisfy the modiﬁed version of equation
(1):
(3)  K    K    L   rL
or




     l(g   r),
where Lis the loan taken out by the ﬁrm, ris the rate of interest charged on
L, and l is the ratio L/K. Since the ﬁrm is not optimizing, there is no natu-
ral way to determine l, and we take its value as given. Then the value of   is
again determined by the identity in equation (3a), and the capital-labor ra-
tio is determined to achieve this value of   through equation (2). This time,
there is an additional complication that, if r is greater than g, there seems
to be no sensible motivation to take out the loan. If a speciﬁc value of l is
viewed as required, however, a solution corresponding to it is feasible with
  being larger than g.
As we have noted earlier, this is not an interesting or believable model of
the behavior of a business ﬁrm. It does illustrate, however, the point that
once the perceived price of a factor is not related to its market price, it is
diﬃcult to write an optimizing model and a number of strange conse-
quences can follow. For a ﬁrm whose behavior is characterized by equations
(2) and (3a), it is perfectly conceivable that its target rate of return,  , is ex-
tremely low, and that the capital-labor ratio turns out to be very large. Its
behavior is not eﬃcient in the normal sense, and the true cost of its produc-
tion must be higher than that of genuinely eﬃcient ﬁrms. Nevertheless, so
long as owners of equity capital do not have to be compensated, the ﬁrm can
go on indeﬁnitely without being forced to liquidate. To prevent the market
value of equity becoming zero, the ﬁrm may pay very small, constant divi-
dends, without changing the basic feature of the model discussed above. It
may be possible to construct a much more realistic and plausible model of
a Japanese ﬁrm in which competing interests of participants are described
carefully. As long as the price attributed to the contribution of one or more
factors by the management is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from their market price,
however, the distortion considered previously must be present, and the al-
location of resources in the whole economy cannot be eﬃcient.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have explored reasons why the market value of equity
of corporations in Japan has not increased to reﬂect their accumulation of
capital. One consequence of this situation is that the Japanese economy
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cur considerable capital losses in their corporate equity holdings and thus
reduce their consumption. This condition does not seem to have any
prospect of resolving itself unless a way can be found to transfer a sub-
stantial amount of resources from corporations to households via sub-
stantially increased dividend payments.
In the standard model of corporate ﬁnance, the present value of future
dividend payments, allowing for the risk involved, determines the market
value of equity. In equilibrium, that value is roughly equal to the value of
accumulated capital, allowing for a variety of special conditions. This may
be viewed as a consequence of nearly rational behavior on the part of man-
agement and the reasonably eﬃcient functioning of markets for factors
and output. Although real market conditions may never be in equilibrium,
we expect that there will be general tendencies to move toward the equilib-
rium. Data covering a large number of corporations and a long period of
time should point to where the equilibrium position is likely to be.
The data for Japan do not resemble such a picture. The historical pattern
of net dividend payments is nearly constant in nominal terms over time and
has nothing to do with the accumulation of capital by corporations. Typi-
cal market participants therefore can only assume that this pattern is likely
to continue. Such an expectation can support only a very low level of the
value of equity, and this distorts savings behavior.
During the high-growth era, Japanese ﬁrms had some justiﬁcation for
retaining and reinvesting earnings. By the early 1990s, however, readily
available technologies enabling increased productivity had become lim-
ited, and Japan’s labor cost had reached approximately the same level as, or
perhaps even above, that of the United States. To maintain balance be-
tween aggregate demand and aggregate supply, therefore, the savings rate
must become lower, and consumption demand must be expanded.
What can be done achieve this and thus remove a serious impediment
to growth? Changes in corporate governance to give equity holders the
capacity to deal with management on more equal terms must be consid-
ered. A complete reform of the accounting system also would be helpful.
The government should consider changing the corporate proﬁt tax sys-
tem. The reformed tax system would encourage corporations to pay out
funds when suﬃciently proﬁtable internal investment opportunities are
not available.
We have estimated the “lost” wealth and the ﬁnancial cost to Japan of
the market valuation discrepancy. The household sector’s lost wealth is
presented in the bottom panel of table 6.2. Essentially, the calculation turns
on estimating what the value of equity would be if Tobin’s q were equal to
1 (a more detailed explanation is given in appendix C, also available at
http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/ando_et_al).
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porations (table 6.2, column [3]) would have been ¥750 trillion (instead of
the actual ¥171 trillion), of which the household sector would have owned
¥475 trillion (rather than its actual ¥81 trillion). This is 395 trillion yen in
lost wealth.
If the marginal propensity to consume out of net worth is 0.04, a rea-
sonable value in terms of available estimates, consumption could have been
larger by almost ¥16 trillion without any multiplier eﬀect. With a very
small multiplier of 1.5, additional consumption could have been more than
¥23 trillion. That would have been enough to put the Japanese economy
back into full employment.
Appendix A
Determining Capital Stock in the Business Sector in Japan
There are several types of reproducible ﬁxed assets reported by the Eco-
nomic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) of the Japanese government in
the National Accounts. However, as several authors have pointed out,
Japan’s depreciation rate is very much higher than the U.S. rate (for ex-
ample Hayashi 1986).
Depreciation rates in the Japanese National Accounts are the same as
those in the tax code, so it is possible that depreciation is overestimated.
Thus, we decided to construct estimates of reproducible ﬁxed assets, ex-
cluding housing, for the business sector (i.e., excluding general government
but including public enterprises) by item and sector. In this appendix we
describe the procedures followed. We decided to use National Accounts es-
timates of dwellings and their depreciation, given that housing in Japan has
some characteristics (such as a substantial portion built with wood) that
make unusually high depreciation rates not implausible.
We have constructed the stock of each type of reproducible ﬁxed asset
by ﬁrst determining the benchmark stock, updating the stock each period
using the perpetual inventory method, and then computing the stock and
depreciation by sector.
Calculation of Benchmark Stock
The National Accounts do not report gross investment data by business
sector and asset type, so we are not able to construct the capital stock of
the business sector directly. Instead, we begin by constructing the aggre-
gate capital stock. First, we calculate the benchmark stock using the Na-
tional Wealth Survey of 1970 (EPA 1970), from which we get the net stock
182 Albert Ando, Dimitrios Christelis, and Tsutomu Miyagawavalue for the business sector, deﬁned as the sum of the whole private sector,
public corporate sector, and nonproﬁt institutions.
We include all assets with the exception of the residential stock and the
stock corresponding to investment in land improvement and divide it into
ﬁve types: (a) buildings, (b) structures, (c) machines and tools, (d) trans-
portation equipment, and (e) plants and animals. The National Wealth
Survey (EPA 1970) is at 1970 prices. We convert it to 1990 prices using the
stock deﬂator reported in National Accounts, table 6.4.1 (“Closing Stocks
of Net Fixed Assets” EPA 2000a).
Accumulation of Capital Stock
To accumulate capital stock using the perpetual inventory method, we
need the investment series and depreciation rate by asset. Investment data
by asset in the National Accounts covers all sectors, including the general
government sector. Using the ratio of government to aggregate invest-
ment, we can impute government investment by item, exclude it from the
aggregate, and thus obtain investment by item for the business sector as a
whole.
We adopt depreciation rates for ﬁxed capital using those reported by
Hayashi and Inoue (1991). Their data for machinery and transportation
equipment includes information on early retirement of capital, whereas the
National Accounts do not. Thus, following their suggestion, we augment
their depreciation rates (based on Hulten and Wykoﬀ 1981) by 40 percent
to take account of this omission.
For buildings, we use the rate reported by Dean, Darrough, and Neef
(1990). For remaining structures, we augment Dean, Darrough, and
Neef’s rates by 20 percent, as Hayashi and Inoue (1991) suggest. For plants
and animals we apply the rate used in the United States by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, as reported in Fraumeni (1997).
Depreciation rates by asset type are as follows:
0.047 Buildings
0.056 Structures
0.157 Machinery, tools, and furnishings
0.245 Transportation equipment (including ships)
0.023 Plants and animals
Using these rates and the perpetual inventory method, we calculate the
capital stock from 1970 to 1998. An adjustment is made for the 1995 Han-
shin-Awaji (Kobe) earthquake by subtracting the estimated losses (pro-
vided by Mr. Mitsuo Hosen of the ESRI) from the capital stock at the end
of 1995.
Assets lost in the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake (in ¥ billions) are as
follows:
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1,895 Structures
22 Machinery, tools, and furnishings
88 Transportation equipment (including ships)
Calculation of Capital Stock by Sector
The National Wealth Surveyof 1970 (EPA 1970) can be used to construct
capital stock by type and sector. Gross investment by sector can be ob-
tained from the National Accounts.
Because housing is excluded from our stock calculation, we have to sub-
tract housing investment, which is recorded in the National Accounts only
for the combined corporate sector and for the combined household and
nonproﬁt institutions sector. We assume that only households and nonﬁ-
nancial corporations invest in residential structures. This seems innocu-
ous, as we combine households and nonproﬁt institutions in any event and
ﬁnancial institutions hold a negligible amount of residential structures
(0.49 percent), as reported in the National Wealth Survey (EPA 1970).
We need the depreciation rate by sector to accumulate the stock. To ob-
tain it, we calculate aggregate depreciation by item, the sum across items,
and then divide by total stock. This provides an implied depreciation rate,
which is used for each individual sector. This implied rate is, on average, a
little above 8 percent, which is a considerably less than the rate obtained
from the National Accounts (table 6.3).
Having obtained gross investment and depreciation, we can use the per-
petual inventory method to obtain capital stock by sector. We allocate the
total loss of assets due to the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake reported above to
each sector according to the stock held at the end of 1994.
The results of our calculations are shown in tables 6A.1 and 6A.2. Table
6A.1 shows our calculation of capital stock and depreciation by item and
compares the totals to the corresponding National Account magnitudes.
Our estimate of aggregate stock shown (column [11]) is roughly 20 percent
higher than the National Account’s (column [13]).
The diﬀerence in depreciation is considerable, especially in the early
years. This is to be expected, as in those years our estimate of the stock is
not very diﬀerent from theirs, whereas our depreciation rates are consider-
ably smaller. In later years, the diﬀerence in stock becomes bigger, and thus
the diﬀerence in depreciation becomes smaller, although still sizeable.
Note that column (14) reports National Accounts depreciation at original
cost (i.e., at 1990 prices) and thus has to be augmented by an estimate of
the capital consumption adjustment (column [15]) to be comparable to our
estimate of depreciation in column (12).
Table 6A.2 reports stocks and depreciation for nonﬁnancial corpora-
tions and ﬁnancial institutions.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Adjusting Depreciation and Capital Stock
In order to interpret the diﬀerences between parts B and C of table 6.3, let
us consider the consequence of constructing the data for depreciation and
the net capital stock assuming a depreciation rate much higher than the
one that actually prevailed in the economy. We have the identity:
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Table 6A.2 Estimates of Capital Stock and Depreciation of Nonﬁnancial and Financial
Corporations
Depreciation of 
Reproducible Fixed  Reproducible Fixed  Depreciation of 
Assets of  Assets of  Reproducible Fixed  Reproducible Fixed
Nonﬁnancial  Nonﬁnancial  Assets of Financial  Assets of Financial 
Corporations Corporations  Institutions  Institutions 
Year (excluding housing) (excluding housing) (excluding housing) (excluding housing)
1970 107,433.5 n.a. 3,471.2 n.a.
1971 126,086.7 8,978.4 3,815.4 290.1
1972 144,164.8 10,647.5 4,117.7 322.2
1973 163,919.0 12,224.6 4,614.4 349.2
1974 179,876.5 13,936.3 5,006.4 392.3
1975 192,334.2 15,146.5 5,344.1 421.6
1976 203,661.9 16,001.7 5,601.3 444.6
1977 214,825.1 16,751.1 5,881.3 460.7
1978 226,630.4 17,493.2 6,123.0 478.9
1979 241,265.9 18,315.9 6,452.8 494.8
1980 257,061.1 19,440.0 6,852.4 519.9
1981 273,501.5 20,650.2 7,251.0 550.5
1982 289,390.9 21,937.7 7,562.7 581.6
1983 303,833.8 23,169.4 7,911.3 605.5
1984 321,308.6 24,324.4 8,349.6 633.4
1985 340,895.5 25,866.4 8,743.7 672.2
1986 360,335.0 27,688.6 9,227.0 710.2
1987 380,552.0 29,452.7 9,962.1 754.2
1988 405,534.9 31,346.0 11,156.9 820.6
1989 436,000.6 33,779.7 12,792.5 929.3
1990 471,103.9 36,777.2 14,760.0 1,079.1
1991 507,740.1 40,201.9 16,438.4 1,259.6
1992 537,485.5 43,587.9 17,679.9 1,411.2
1993 559,048.6 46,018.1 18,460.6 1,513.7
1994 576,722.5 47,394.7 19,105.6 1,565.0
1995 593,505.1 48,365.8 19,262.8 1,602.3
1996 621,008.5 49,711.4 20,180.7 1,613.4
1997 653,546.3 52,395.0 21,423.6 1,702.7
1998 676,024.1 55,542.8 22,568.1 1,820.7
Source: See appendix A.
Note: n.a.   not available.(A1) IGt   Dt   Kt   Kt   1,
where IGtis gross investment, Dtis depreciation, and Ktis the stock of cap-

























t 1  ,
where Q is the value added measure of output. On a steady growth path,
the rate of growth of Qt should be equal to the rate of growth of Kt. De-
noting this growth rate by g and deﬁning dt as Dt/Kt–1 and igt as IGt/Qt, we
have, on the steady state growth path,

















The Japanese economy has not been on a steady state growth path.
Therefore, we cannot apply equation (A2) to the Japanese data directly.
However, we can rely on the reasoning leading up to equation (A2) to for-
mulate a hypothesis concerning the potential biases that are likely to be
present in the Japanese data. For this purpose, let us note that the quantity
ig is known, and there is no reason to suppose that information on this
quantity is biased one way or another; the same is true of Q. The variable
D is generated by multiplying Kt–1 by an assumed value of d, and Kt is gen-
erated by the formula of equation (A1). Therefore, for a given g, if the as-
sumed value of d is much larger than the true value of d, the recorded val-
ues of K and K/Q must be smaller than the true values of K and K/Q. For
example, if ig is 0.2 and g is 0.02, and the true value of d is 0.08, then the
true value of K/Q would be 2.0. If the value of d is incorrectly assumed to
be 0.12, and the time series of K is generated by the perpetual inventory
procedure, however, the resulting recorded value of K/Q approaches 1.5.
That is, the estimate of capital stock under the assumption that d is 0.12 is
roughly 75 percent of the correct value. Similarly, the estimate of depreci-
ation, D, with the incorrectly large depreciation rate of 12 percent will be
roughly 112.5 percent of the correct value.
Returning to table 6.3 and comparing the last values of columns (2) and
(5) between parts B and C, we see that the estimates of the depreciation and
capital stock with 12 percent depreciation rate are roughly 85 percent
and119 percent, respectively, of estimates with 8 percent depreciation rate.
Given that the Japanese economy was by no means in a steady state equi-
librium condition during the period leading up to 1998, we believe that our
empirical results are within the reasonable range of our analytical predic-
tions.
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Computing Lost Household Wealth
To compute lost wealth we assume that there is no market value discrep-
ancy for corporations—that is, the market value of net equity is equal to
accounting equity, which is the same as saying that Tobin’s average q is 1.
We then made four additional assumptions, listed below, to create a hypo-
thetical distribution of equities among sectors. This is used to calculate the
household sector’s adjusted net worth.
Assumptions Regarding Distribution
1. Government entries do not change, because virtually all its equity is
in public corporations that are not traded and whose objectives are typi-
cally quite diﬀerent from those of proﬁt-seeking ones.
2. The ratio of equity owned to net equity for the corporate sector as a
whole (table 6.2, column [3]) remains the same. That is, line (i )   j  (i/j).
3. The ratio of nonﬁnancial equity owned to total corporate equity
owned remains the same. That is, for line (i ), the ratio of column (1) to col-
umn (3) is the same as for line (i). The same is true for the ratio of column
(2) to column (3).
4. The relative distribution of equities between households and the rest
of the world remains the same. That is, for line (j ), the ratio of column (5)
to (column [3] minus column [4]) is the same as for line (j).
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